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Abstract
The basic narrative on climate change between the rich and poor worlds has been problematic. The focus 
on emissions has made industrial countries inadequately sensitive to the unmet energy needs in developing 
countries. And it has led developing countries to adopt the rhetoric of recrimination and focus on the legacy 
of historical emissions by industrial countries. The ensuing blame game has led to the current gridlock.  As a 
way out, we suggest some simple principles for determining equitable distribution of emission cuts between 
developed and developing countries to meet global targets. These principles emphasize basic energy needs and 
the equality of access to energy opportunities rather than emissions, taking account of development levels, as 
well as energy efficiency in creating such opportunities. To apply these principles, we develop a new data set 
to distinguish between energy needs and emissions-intensity for major developing- and developed-country 
emitters and quantify the relationship between these variables and changes in income (or development). 
This quantification allows us to project emissions levels in 2050. Our main finding is that meeting global 
emissions targets equitably requires very large, probably revolutionary, improvements in the carbon intensity 
of production and consumption, much larger than seen historically. We conclude that a new shared narrative 
that places equality of energy opportunities at the forefront would naturally shift the focus of international 
cooperation from allocating emissions “rights” or reductions and blame to maximizing efforts to achieving 
technology gains and rapidly transferring them worldwide.  Abandoning the setting of emissions targets for 
developing counries and creating instead a framework where all countries contribute to maximizing technology 
creation and diffusion is what Copenhagen should be about.
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What constitutes equitable burden-sharing on actions to address climate change is of 
fundamental importance and at the heart of differences between the rich and poor countries. It is 
really a question less of economics than of ethics, politics, and history.  
 
Two recent, and important and influential reports on this subject—Nick Stern’s Richard Ely 
Lecture of 2008, and the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2008)—advocated allocating the 
future burden of emission reductions according to the 80-20 formula: rich countries would 
reduce their total emissions by 80 percent by 2050 relative to 1990 levels and poor countries by 
20 percent. The World Bank’s latest World Development Report does not advocate this split 
explicitly but could be seen as providing tacit support for it. 
 
But these cuts do not seem to be based on any fundamental principles.  They seem rather to be a 
combination of practical arithmetic (that the current science suggests total emissions in 2050 will 
have to be at least 50 percent below what they were in 1990) and political realities (based on the 
sense that rich countries cannot sell cuts larger than 80 percent domestically) combined with a 
nod to equity (that on the whole it seems fair that emissions per capita in developed countries, 
now about 10 times greater than in developing countries, ought to be converging or close to it by 
2050, which is what the 80:20 split delivers very broadly).
1 
 
Meanwhile the only agreed principle in the context of the formal negotiations of a global 
agreement is the idea of “common but differentiated” obligations.  In the absence of a more 
fundamental agreed principle about what is fair, and thus of any kind of shared narrative about 
the nature of the challenge, the formal negotiations of a climate change agreement, including 
between large developing country emitters (China and India especially) and the developed 
countries (the United States especially) are heavily constrained by their respective domestic 
politics.  In the United States the media focus on the fact that China’s total emissions now 
exceed those of the U.S., reinforcing the view, including in the U.S. Congress, that the U.S. 
should not commit to any reductions in its own emissions without explicit commitments by 
China and other major developing country emitters to reductions as well – in a reprise of the 
view that led to the U.S. Senate’s 1997 resolution opposing any treaty that like Kyoto did not 
include such commitments by developing countries.  Meanwhile in China and India, domestic 
politics and the reality and the demands of their growing economies for energy to drive growth 
and development, lead to a focus on their far lower per capita emissions.   
 
Economists and other social analysts have not contributed effectively to resolving the tension 
between developed and developing countries around the question of burden-sharing – beyond 
defining the general principles of efficiency and equity as the basis for any agreement – and 
accepting the logic of “common but differentiated” obligations. Like Stern and UNDP, other 
authors (Frankel, 2009; Jacoby et. al., 2008) have tended to discuss the issue in terms of 
allocating the future “rights” to emissions across countries -- based on such parameters or 
combinations of them as current total emissions, cumulative past emissions, emissions per capita, 
per capita income and so forth. 
                                                 
1 In Stern (2008), the arithmetic is that by 2050, total emissions should be down to about 20 gtons of GHGs, which 
should be divided equally between the world’s population (about 9 billion in 2050) on the basis of some loose notion 
that every citizen has an equal right to pollute the global sink, an equal right to emissions. 2 
 
 
Not only are these proposals mostly arbitrary on burden-sharing. They are framed in our view 
from the wrong starting point, i.e. starting from the assumption that what is fundamental is the 
right to pollute or the right to the atmosphere in its capacity as a global sink. This starting point, 
has afflicted the basic conversation on climate change between rich and poor worlds—what one 
might call the narrative—in a way that has led to misunderstanding and recrimination and hence 
to limited progress in climate change discussions. 
 
To move beyond this narrative, we propose a different perspective to an equitable distribution of 
burden sharing grounded in three principles. 
 
1. Energy not emissions: First, and foremost, we posit that from an ethical perspective, what is 
primary is not the “right” to pollute, but access of people as consumers, independent of where 
they live, to basic energy-based amenities – such as meal preparation at home, pleasant ambient 
temperatures indoors, and or access to transportation ensuring personal mobility, at reasonable 
cost. The conflation of emissions and energy use is not surprising, since the production of energy 
to provide these services has historically been carbon-intensive.  But as we show the link varies 
across countries and time.
2 Equity in, or comparability of, access to energy-based services should 
be the touchstone, not emissions. Of course, the extent of pollution will have to observe the 
critical constraint of not heating the planet beyond what are now considered critical tipping 
points but that is a constraint not the primary objective.  
 
2. History as guide to equitable energy access: Our second key point is that the right to energy 
services should be determined by a simple historical rule: developing countries’ peoples’ future 
access to energy services per se (not to emissions) should be no different from the energy 
services enjoyed by rich countries’ peoples at the latter’s comparable stages of development.  Put 
differently, it would seem unfair for people in developing countries to be deprived of such access 
merely because they are late-comers to the development process-- late-comers, in the sense of 
others already having used up a key resource for development. To give a simple example, the 
access of a household in Chennai (India) to the services provided by air-conditioning or by 
cooking gas should be no different from its counterpart in Austin (United States) at comparable 
levels of income per capita.
3 
 
3. Future as basis for carbon efficiency: Lest this sound like a recipe for blowing up the planet, 
we add a third key point. While developing country people’s access to energy services should not 
be compromised, the manner in which these services are met, or the efficiency of meeting given 
energy services, need not follow the same history-based trajectory as followed in the past in the 
advanced countries. For developing countries, the efficiency of meeting energy needs should 
reflect the most efficient technology actually available to them now and in the future, not the 
                                                 
2 Our analysis below allows for the possibility of substitution across different forms of energy (as an input) – e.g. out 
of coal into hydro, nuclear and renewables – as a key mechanism for reducing the emissions-intensity of energy use 
(that is, as an output); indeed this may be the solution more easily affected by policy than any solution requiring 
reduced use of energy services (the output).    
3 One problem with this principle is it implicitly advocates replicating the historical errors made by rich countries in 
an era of low carbon prices. For example, cheap energy may have facilitated spatial location of production and 
consumption (migration from New England to Texas may have become feasible because of cheap air conditioning). 
As we note below, going forward developing countries in their own interests will want to avoid the public policies 
and practices that created incentives that led to these errors. 3 
 
technology used by advanced countries at comparable stages of development. To go back to the 
example, the technology used by the household in Chennai in getting the air-conditioning 
services in 2025 should not be the same as that used by the Austin household in 1990 (when say 
it had the same income level); instead, it should reflect and be very similar to the technology 
used by the Austin household in 2025 itself.  
 
Making energy rather than emissions the touchstone brings the development dimension back into 
the climate change conversation in a way that was envisaged in the 1992 Rio declaration. It also 
has the advantage of avoiding a number of problems that an emissions-based approach has 
created. How so? 
 
On the industrial country side, the focus on total emissions, while understandable given its close 
connections with the climate change problem, reflects an inadequate sensitivity to the unmet 
energy needs in developing countries, and the vast current inequities in energy access. That 
industrial countries can still contemplate trade sanctions against countries that consume one-fifth 
as much energy per capita as they do is one manifestation of the gulf that needs to be bridged.   
 
A focus on emissions per capita while more equitable than that on total emissions is also 
problematic. The Stern Review and the Indian Prime Minister have conferred a special status on 
convergence in emissions per capita as a steady state objective. But as we show below disparities 
in energy use are even greater than those in emissions per capita.  Consider the following 
example. Suppose the US and India achieved equality of emissions per capita in 2050. Suppose 
too that the US did so with a combination of very high energy use (consumption profligacy) and 
carbon efficiency. And suppose that India achieved it through a combination of very low energy 
use and carbon inefficiency. This would not be a fair outcome. Only if and when income per 
capita (and thus energy use per capita) and technology converge in the steady state can we  
expect convergence in  emissions per capita. Until those two conditions are satisfied (well after 
2050 by any reasonable assumptions), energy use and technology will merit separate attention; 
focusing on a combination of the two (i.e., emissions) could perpetuate inequitable development 
outcomes as the example illustrates.  
 
The focus on emissions by developing countries has also created problems. They 
have insisted, with some justification, that the rich are responsible for past emissions and hence 
should pay “reparations” (a position espoused for example by Bhagwati (2006) in calling for the 
creation of a financial pool based on the experience of the Superfund clean-up in the United 
States); the rich retort by asking poor countries to take on the responsibility of having much 
larger populations and to recognize the contribution of the rich to the stock of new technologies 
and other global public goods. Regardless of the merits of these arguments, the blame game—a  
consequence of the prevailing narrative—has resulted in a level of mistrust that (as we write in 




The structure of the paper is as follows. Following a description of basic approach and data 
(Section II), we quantify the historical relationships between development on the one hand and 
energy consumption per capita,CO2 efficiency in production, and CO2 efficiency in 
                                                 
4 While a focus on energy and efficiency rather than emissions might help the debate on climate change mitigation, 
whether this would carry over to the adaptation debate is less clear. 4 
 
consumption, on the other, using data covering developed and developing countries for the 
period 1994-2005 (Section III). We discuss briefly the resulting “development elasticities”, 
focusing in particular on the broad differences between developed and developing countries and 
the trends within the two groups.  
 
In Section IV, we use our development elasticities along with assumptions about economic and 
population growth as the basis for projecting CO2 emissions in 2050 under a baseline or business 
as usual scenario, and then under two additional scenarios, based on different values for the 
development elasticities.
5  In doing so we take into account two constraints (that reflect our 
second principle): developing countries should not face limits on per capita income growth (i.e. 
development) as a result of global efforts to reduce emissions; and  developing countries’ access 
to direct energy-related services should not be compromised. In a final section (V) we discuss the 
implications of our analysis and conclude. 
 
As implied above, our more fundamental objective is to reframe the implicit “narrative” that has 
affected the negotiating positions of the major emitters, especially the United States in the 
developed world and China and India in the developing world.  We believe our analysis provides 
the foundation for a less contentious and more productive negotiation and for recognition of 
common ground built on a common interest in maximizing the technological options and rapid 
diffusion of those options at reasonable cost.  We return to this issue in our concluding section. 
 
Section II. Model and Basic Data 
 
 We begin by noting that overall emissions stem from consumption of direct energy-related 
services and from emissions related to production and that these two need to be looked at 
separately. (Throughout we use “emissions” to refer to CO2 emissions.) 
 
Total emissions, excluding from deforestation (which we ignore for lack of good data for many 
countries, particularly in the past) can be expressed as: 
 
Total emissions = emissions associated with production activity (“production emissions”) + 
emissions associated with “consumption of direct energy-related services” -- hereafter CDERS 
or  “seeders”)               ------  (1) 
 
Production emissions in turn can be expressed as:  
 
Production emissions =   (Emissions in production activity per unit of GDP) * (GDP) 
           ------  (2) 
 
Consumption emissions can be disaggregated as:  
 
                                                 
5 We recognize that meeting global targets involves complicated CO2 dynamics in which the path of emissions 
beginning in 2020 is important. We focus on 2050 for analytical tractability but mainly because it helps to highlight 
the issues for Copenhagen more clearly. But our framework can easily be adapted to project the entire path of 
emissions from 2020. 5 
 
Consumption emissions per capita = CDERsper capita * emissions per unit of energy 
consumed                              --------(3) 
                                                                                           
 
Thus the three variables of interest are:  
 
(i)  Direct energy-related services or CDERsper capita – the variable most closely 
corresponding to our equity principle; 
(ii)  Emissions from consumption per unit of energy consumed or simply the carbon-
intensity of energy consumption; 




The aim is to disentangle inefficiency of CO2 emissions generation (in production and 




For a number of major GHG-emitting countries, we are able to calculate estimated household- or 
consumption-based emissions using data available from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
on fossil fuel CO2 emissions across countries and over time, including from residential 
electricity use and vehicle use. To distinguish household transportation services from production-
based transportation we used data from the International Road Federation (IRF) and United 
States Transportation Bureau to estimate the share of road transportation emissions associated 
with personal automobile use, including the extensive use of light trucks and sport utility 
vehicles. (Appendix 1 provides more detail.) 
 
Our production emissions variable is simply total emissions minus consumption emissions, so 
that we are including energy transformation emissions in production emissions (see Appendix 1). 
Actual production-based emissions include emissions from commercial, industrial, agricultural, 
and production-based transportation activities (Appendix Table 1) plus those produced in the 
transformation of energy, primarily to produce electricity.     
 
For our key variable of interest, CDERs by consumers, we want to capture the consumption of 
energy-based services (and the resulting welfare gain for individual consumers). The CO2 data 
for CDERS relate to personal vehicle use and household electricity use; we would ideally have a 
measure of the outputs of services associated with these aspects of consumption. That is, for 
personal vehicle use, we would have a measure of distance travelled, and for electricity use, a 
measure of energy consumption such as kilowatt hours. We have some data on vehicle miles 
driven, but only for some countries for some years, and the data on kilowatt hours of electricity 
consumed are even more limited. We therefore had to opt for input-based rather than output-
based measures of energy services. Our variable representing CDERs is therefore the energy 
(measured in kilotons of oil equivalent -KTOEs) that goes into the “production” of road travel 
                                                 
6 Thus, increases in the carbon intensity in consumption and production signal greater inefficiency.  
7 It is worth noting that many analyses of climate change (UNDP, 2008; World Bank, 2010) compute energy 
intensities of an economy by dividing total emissions by GDP. It is important to disaggregate as we have done to 
distinguish behavioral parameters (energy use) from technology parameters (carbon intensities in production and 
consumption).   6 
 
and electricity generation; the KTOE data were obtained from IEA and IRF data.
8  In short, our 
CDER variable is not a pure measure of “energy services” but includes a substantial component 
of “energy” relative to the actual service that generates a welfare gain at the individual level. 
 
Table 1 presents some basic energy use and emissions data for 2005 disaggregated along the 
lines shown in equations 1-3. For all countries, emissions from production still accounts for the 
bulk of total emissions. However, the share of emissions related to consumption is substantially 
greater for industrial countries (about 42-43%) for the US, France and the UK) compared with 
India (22%) and China (14%).  
 
The data show that industrial countries have indeed made a lot of progress in production 
efficiency—which can be seen in a decline in our measure, which is the CO2 emissions generated 
in production as a share of GDP (Figure 1 plots this ratio for some major emitters).
9 Currently, 
for example, India is about 4 ½ times more inefficient than the US in production and even more 
so compared to some European countries (Table 1, column 6). China is almost twice as 
inefficient as India. But viewed historically, countries such as India both in terms of the level and 
trajectory of CO2 emissions do not appear to be doing badly.  
 
This inefficiency of India and China, however, is less pronounced on the consumption side 
(column 5). For every unit of consumption, India generates 2-3 times more CO2 emissions than 
do the industrial countries and China about 1½-2 times more (Figure 2).  Appendix Figure 1 
(bottom right hand panel) shows the striking gains made by Brazil when it introduced its push for 
the use of ethanol in automobiles.   
 
The greatest disparities, however, relate to CDERs, our basic measure of energy consumption per 
capita (column 5). The United States’ per capita consumption of energy is about 9 times that of 
China and 18 times that of India. Even the less profligate European countries consume 
substantially greater amounts of energy per capita than China and India (Figure 3). 
 
One advantage of disaggregating emissions as we have done is to isolate the policy or actionable 
elements. For example, in the popular debate, the contrast is made between the total emissions 
per capita of the US and Europe on the one hand and developing countries on the other (column 
1). But this aggregate comparison is misleading. On the one hand, it obscures the high levels of 
inefficiency in developing countries today (although not necessarily from a historical 
perspective); on the other, it obscures the striking consumption profligacy of the industrial 
countries.  
 
Figure 2 plots consumption energy use per capita by per capita income for selected rich and poor  
countries.
10 Consumption of energy per capita appears to have been rising slowly, especially in 
the United States. It is also rising in Brazil, though from relatively low levels compared to the 
                                                 
8 We tried to calculate a more direct measure of energy services consumed using data available for some countries 
on vehicle miles driven.  See Appendix table 2 for evidence, consistent with our approach, of the direct relationship 
between miles driven and GDP per capita for OECD countries, 1994 - 2005.  But for most developing  countries -- 
including China and India -- data on miles travelled were not sufficient to identify a robust correlation between 
CDERS and GDP per capita. 
9 Appendix Figures 1and 2 plot the variables of interest for individual countries but disaggregated by sectors—
household energy use and travel. 
10 We use country-specific weighted averages of transport and road emissions in Figures 2 and 3.  See Appendix 1. 7 
 
United States and compared to lower-income China.  The low emissions in Brazil may be the 
outcome of its reliance on ethanol as vehicle fuel. Figure 3 plots consumption intensity for 
selected countries. Consumption intensity has been rising in China, India, and Brazil. 
Consumption emissions intensity has been rising with income in those countries, though it is still 
below levels in the U.S. and other rich countries, where it appears to have stabilized.  
 
III. History: Estimating the development elasticities 
 
Our key argument is that the right to CDERs in the future should: (i) stem from an energy rather 
than an emissions perspective; (ii) be determined by the simple historic principle that the CDER 
profile for developing countries should be no different than that for industrial countries; but (iii) 
that this principle need not, and even should not, apply as such to the efficiency of meeting those 
CDERs.   
 
In order to project future emissions, applying these principles, we need to quantify the historic 
development trajectory of the rich countries on each of the three variables we have identified: 
CDERs, the carbon intensity of consumption, and the carbon intensity of production. That is, we 
want to understand the relationship between each of these variables and the past development 
trajectory of the rich countries and quantify them in so-called development elasticities. 
 
To estimate these development elasticities, we run panel regressions using annual data for a set 
of 25 developed countries for the period 1994-2005.
11 We use country fixed effects in all our 
specifications to control for special features of countries.
12 We run two specifications: a linear 
one, relating the relevant variable to income per capita (measured in constant PPP terms), and a 
quadratic specification relating the variable to income and income-squared (all variables are 
measured in log terms).  
 
In Table 2, we report the results of this estimation for the consumption of energy variable 
(CDERs per capita). The estimates in both specifications are correctly signed and statistically 
significant. The magnitudes also seem plausible: for example, in the linear specification we 
obtain a development elasticity of energy consumption of about 0.8 for rich countries. That is, 
for every 1 percent increase in income per capita, per capita energy consumption increases by 0.8 
percent. 
 
As noted before, our CDER measure is an input-based measure of energy. We cross-check our 
findings by running similar regressions for output-based measures relating to personal transport. 
These results are reported in Appendix Table 2. The development elasticity for the output 
measure is broadly similar to the input-based measure.  
 
We ran similar regressions for a sample of 12 developing countries with reasonable data. The 
linear specification yielded a coefficient of the CDER elasticity of 0.96. This near-unitary 
                                                 
11 The sample of rich and poor countries is reported in Appendix Table 5.  The elasticities were calculated from 
OECD countries and a select group of non-OECD countries, and then applied to a much larger sample of rich and 
poor countries for overall emissions reductions.   
12 In other words, our elasticities are not biased by the fact that the US is a large country and say Denmark is small 
because in essence we are only exploiting the variation across time within a country not across countries. We did not 
use time effects because of their high collinearity with the per capita GDP term on the right hand side.  8 
 
elasticity of energy needs in developing countries seems plausible because energy needs are 
highly elastic at low levels of income.
13 
 
For the development elasticity of the carbon-intensity of production, we estimate similar pooled 
regressions. Our results are reported in Table 3.  In both sets of countries, the elasticity of the 
carbon intensity of production is negative, implying that with income the carbon intensity of 
production declines.  Moreover, this elasticity is more negative for the rich countries (-0.9) 
compared to the poor (-0.55), suggesting again that the rich countries have made greater strides 
on CO2 efficiency in production. Moreover, in the quadratic specifications, we find evidence for 
an inverted U: that is, the development elasticity of carbon intensity increases (i.e. worsens) up to 
a certain threshold level of income (about US$ 12,700) and then declines.  
 
We repeat this exercise to estimate the development elasticity of the carbon intensity of 
consumption. Here we tried two different specifications: in the first we related the carbon 
intensity of consumption to income per capita; and in a second to income per capita and the 
carbon intensity of production.  The rationale for including the latter is the hypothesis that there 
would be some spillover from efficiency gains in production to consumption. These results are 
reported in Table 4.  
 
In these regressions, the quadratic specification for the developed countries (column 3) implies 
that efficiency increases (or intensity declines), but only until per capita income of about 
$40,000, beyond which inefficiency sets in – possibly reflecting the increased carbon intensity of 
consumption in the United States and a few other developed countries during the early 21
st 
century boom; we do not believe that pattern of growing intensity/inefficiency is likely in the 
future. In the column 5 specification, the high correlation between income per capita and the 
carbon intensity of production leads to unstable estimates when both are included. Thus, our 
preferred specification is that in column one, in which the only right-hand side variable is income 
per capita. In this specification, the development elasticity of consumption inefficiency is -0.1 for 
rich and 0.1 for poor countries.  These estimates are again plausible (see Appendix figures) 
insofar as they imply that the rich have made greater strides in improving the carbon efficiency 
of consumption than the poor; the positive elasticity for the latter suggests that they appear to be 
at a stage where income growth still leads to a high and rising carbon intensity of consumption.   
 
Thus, our empirical analysis covering the period 1994-2005 clarifies that:  (1) developing 
countries are still far more carbon-intensive in their production than are developed countries, but 
that in virtually all countries, the elasticity is negative, that is, the trend is in the direction of 
greater efficiency; (2) there are also efficiency gains  in terms of emissions associated with 
consumption though they are more modest; in developed countries, the elasticity with respect to 
recent to income growth is negative but in developing countries it is positive (though low);  (3) 
in marked contrast, energy use in both sets of countries is still rising almost as fast as income, 
particularly in developing countries.  In developed countries, the elasticity is lower than in 
developing countries and (as the quadratic suggests) is trending down, perhaps because people 
are conserving with income growth, either using less energy directly (turning down the 
thermostat) or investing to insulate and using less energy for the same degree of warmth.
14  The 
                                                 
    
13 The quadratic specification for the poor countries did not seem plausible. 
14 We could distinguish between these two possibilities only if we had a measure of the energy service outcome 
(“warmth”) but we have only a measure of the energy service input (household use of energy in ktoes).  9 
 
implication is not surprising; energy services are a normal good and we should expect demand 
for them to rise with income – and apparently somewhat faster at lower levels of income where 
“needs” have been less fully met.   
 
IV. Projecting Emissions in 2050 under alternative scenarios 
 
Based on these development elasticities, we now project emissions in 2050 under alternative 
scenarios. The methodology for these projections is explained in detail in Appendix 2. 
15 
 
Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario 
We start first with the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. While we have estimated 
historical development elasticities, it is possible that these will change over time. For example, 
the fact that the elasticity of production efficiency with respect to income has been declining in 
the past implies it will decline further over time, even in the business-as-usual scenario. We take 
this into account by estimating an elasticity for 2005 and for 2050. We then average these two to 
capture the behavior over the period as a whole (details are described in Appendix 2 and a 
summary of these elasticities is presented in table 5). We use this same procedure for projecting 
the carbon intensity of consumption. 
 
For developing countries too, we need elasticities for 2005 and 2050. For the former, we use the 
historic development elasticities estimated from our regressions. For 2050, we assume that these 
elasticities will evolve not in a manner resembling their own past gains in efficiency but will also 
benefit from future technological improvements driven by “development” (income growth) in 
the developed countries; as developing countries close the income gap with developed countries, 
there will be some flow of these new technologies from rich to poor. So this scenario reflects the 
assumption that the efficiency parameters for the poor will converge toward the rich country 
parameters by a factor depending on how much of the income gap between rich and poor is 
narrowed.  
 
For the CDERs, which are demand-based and meant to reflect need rather than being linked to 
technology, we assume that poor countries will behave in the future like the rich countries have 
behaved at a comparable stage in their development in the past.
16 This reflects our second 
principle that energy services should be related to income levels – which as our empirical results 
told us for the recent past, implies increases in demand and use that are close to pari passu with 
increases in income per capita.  
 
Table 5 shows the resulting calculated elasticities for 2005 and for 2050.  The alpha parameters 
refer to the development elasticity of the carbon intensity of production emissions, the gamma 
parameters to the development elasticity of the carbon intensity of consumption emissions, and 
the beta parameters to the development elasticity of energy use per capita.  
 
                                                 
15 We should note an important caveat here. Clearly, emissions reductions efforts will themselves have a feedback 
effect on growth which we do not incorporate. More broadly, capturing many of these effects will require a fully-
specified dynamic model which is beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim is to highlight some broad principles and 
effects rather than identify precisely the relevant magnitudes. 
16 Technically, this means that we use the rich country beta parameter for the poor countries, calibrated for the level 
of development.  10 
 
One point that we want to  highlight is the distinction between principles two and three. In 
principle two, we argue that history can be a guide in determining energy access. But principle 
three embodies the notion that the future not history should be the basis for carbon efficiency. To 
illustrate this distinction, we draw attention to the alpha and beta parameters in Table 5. For 
developing countries, we assume that the future beta parameter (which reflects consumption of 
energy services) will be the same as the industrial country value when the latter attained the 
income level that developing countries will in the future. In contrast, for developing countries, 
we do not assume that the future alpha parameter (which captures carbon efficiency in 
production) will be the same as the industrial country value when the latter attained the income 
level that developing countries will in the future. Had we done so, the value of the alpha 
parameter would have been -1.06. Instead, we assume a value of -1.63, a considerably higher 
level of efficiency, because we into account gains in carbon efficiency that will occur in the 
future.  
 
Based on these assumptions, in the BAU scenario, we find that rich countries’ emissions will 
increase by about 50 percent and poor country emissions by about 190 percent from the 1990 
baseline year.  
 
In this scenario, we can back out what might be called a notional or a benchmark equitable 
burden sharing rule for rich and poor countries. This is done by asking what percentage 
emissions reduction would have to be implemented in the rich countries given the BAU 
emissions profile for poor countries and given the scientifically determined constraint that global 
emissions will have to decline by 50 percent relative to 1990 levels to prevent environmental 
catastrophe. This serves as a benchmark because it identifies clearly how much rich countries 
would  have to do (or undo) to ensure that the development potential of poor countries is not 
compromised or constrained because of past actions of the rich countries – in the absence of 
technological or behavioral changes beyond  those associated with increasing income per capita 
(or “development”).  In some respects this is similar to the argument of those who call for all the 
incremental burden of reductions to be borne by the rich countries, and to those who argue for 
future emission rights to be based inversely on cumulative past emissions. But our derivation is 
different because it is based not on emissions per se but on the objective of energy needs and 
development and is clearly related to the principle of historic comparability that we have 
advanced.  
 
Equitable burden sharing in the business-as-usual scenario would involve rich countries cutting 
their emissions by 251 percent; that is, for developing countries to continue on a relatively 
unconstrained development path, rich countries would have to find ways not just of going to zero 
emissions but actually contributing negative emissions (for example, through re-forestation that 
adds to the carbon absorption capacity of the atmosphere). While this may be unrealistic and 
even scientifically infeasible, it shows that the 80-20 emission reductions rule that is currently 
being discussed could in fact, in the absence of more rapid technological or other changes, 
constrain the development process in poor countries despite seeming to put the greater burden of 
future emissions reductions on the rich countries. 
 
Under this equitable burden sharing rule (which is still very demanding because it assumes that 
developing countries will continue to make strides in carbon efficiency), China and India would 
increase their emissions relative to 1990 levels by about 172 percent and 349 percent, 11 
 
respectively. Their corresponding emissions per capita numbers would be 6.30 and 2.62.
17 These 
are the relevant numbers that should inform the debate on equitable burden sharing and provide a 
contrast with current view that developing countries should cut their emissions by 20 percent.   
 
Current technology frontier scenario 
In our second scenario, we assume that for the period 2005-2050, all developed countries reach 
the frontier level of carbon efficiency in consumption and production and also reach the frontier 
level of restraint in energy consumption. These frontier levels are determined by running the 
three sets of regressions for each country, and identifying that country which has the best 
performance. For efficiency levels in consumption and production, Germany is the best 
performer (see Appendix Table 4); and Australia is the best performer on the energy use 
elasticity. For developing countries, we assume that the efficiency parameters follow the 
developed country efficiency parameters.  That is, we apply the absolute difference between the 
efficiency parameters in Scenario 1 to the efficiency parameters in Scenario 2.   
 
But we continue to assume that the direct consumption energy related needs of poor countries are 
as in the BAU scenario. In other words, we posit that equitable burden sharing involves no 
reduction in the energy needs of developing countries relative to the BAU scenario. This 
assumption is, of course, at the heart of our equity principle. 
 
 With these assumptions, total emissions still rise by nearly 47 percent in developing countries 
(while declining by 12 percent in the rich countries). Global emissions rise by 15 percent. In this 
scenario, with all countries reaching the current frontier, an equitable burden sharing rule would 
require the rich to decrease emissions by 132 percent.  
 
Avoiding Armaggedon scenario 
Neither of the scenarios described above comes close to meeting the target for reducing global 
emissions by 50 percent by 2050 – indeed they both imply emissions continuing to rise. In the 
final scenario, we ask what improvements in the efficiency parameters are necessary in rich 
countries which if also adjusted rapidly in developing countries would deliver the global 
emissions reductions target of 50 percent by 2050.  To ensure a total reduction of 50 percent, we 
impose sufficient reduction of the alphas and gammas in the developed  countries, while 
maintaining the absolute differences between them noted in Scenario 2 – in effect assuming 
massive improvements in technology in the developed countries and considerable catch-up in the 
developing countries via transfer of technology and their own technological breakthroughs. We 
continue to assume that poor countries’ energy consumption services are not compromised in 
this scenario. 
 
As Table 6 shows, very large improvements in the efficiency parameters in both developed and 
developing countries are necessary to meet the global target consistent with avoiding climate 
change Armaggedon. Compared to the business-as-usual scenario, our calculations imply that the 
elasticity of the carbon intensity of production in developed countries would have to improve 
                                                 
17 The 1990 level of total emissions for China was 2,243 MTCO2, whereas the projected level of total emissions in 
2050 is 8,796 MTCO2, which represents a four-fold increase.  Population is projected to increase by over 260 
million at an average annual growth of 0.18%, which yields the final value of 6.30 tCO2 per capita.  Note that even 
after the tremendous growth in absolute emissions, emissions per capita is still far below that of the US today. 12 
 
(decline) by 2.5 percentage points, from -1.45 to -4.06; and the elasticity of the carbon intensity 
of consumption by 0.9 percentage points, from -.07 to -0.99.  
 
How big are these required changes? One way to assess whether such gains are possible is to ask 
whether similar gains have even been achieved in the past by the industrial countries.  One 
natural experiment that we can exploit to shed light on this question is the oil price shock in the 
early 1970s, when energy prices increased four -fold.  We estimated the development elasticities 
for the carbon intensity of production and for energy use for periods before and after that oil 
shock.  The results are reported in Table 7. We find that the production elasticity improved (i.e. 
declined) substantially from about -0.1 to -1.1 before and after the oil shock; for the energy use 
elasticity the improvement was far more modest, with a decrease from 1.25 to 1.16 between the 
two periods.  
 
While these numbers are merely illustrative, they nevertheless confirm two findings of our 
analysis of development elasticities (in which we assessed the apparent effects of changes in per 
capita income as opposed to price changes
18): (1)  at least in the case of oil-based services, 
efficiency gains were far more responsive to the price increase than was demand for the service – 
consistent with our approach of imposing in our scenarios far greater declines (“improvements”) 
in the alphas and gammas than in the betas);  and (2) even with the massive energy price changes 
in the early 1970s, the improvement in efficiency was far short of what will be required in the 
future if global emission targets are to be met.   
 
Sensitivity analysis points to the same conclusion. We ask what the impact on emissions 
outcomes would be of changing the (alpha and gamma) efficiency parameters as opposed to the 
(beta) CDERs parameter. These map roughly into a comparison of the bang-for-the-buck from 
technology improvements versus conservation efforts. We find that for an equal percentage 
change in the two, the bigger impact on emissions is greater from changing the efficiency 
parameters in part because even going forward emissions in production will constitute the larger 
part of total emissions. Table 8 illustrates this.   
 
A 25 percent improvement in the efficiency parameters reduces global emissions by a further 13 
percent from 50 percent to 63 percent. In contrast, a 25 percent reduction in the energy use 
parameter reduces global emissions only by a further 6 percent. This has the implication that 
getting developing countries or for that matter developed country consumers to compromise on 
their energy needs may not necessarily be where the major policy effort should reside. It is 
perhaps far better to focus on technology improvements without which, in any case, there is no 
prospect for achieving the global emissions targets. Reducing the carbon-intensity of both 
production and consumption-based emissions rather than reducing consumption profligacy or 
consumption of energy services per se is where the big bang for the buck seems to reside. 
 
V. Discussion and key take-aways  
 
In a recent Financial Times-Harris poll, 60 percent of Americans thought that in any climate 
change agreement China should reduce emissions the most. And in the same poll, only 20 
percent of respondents agreed that “since developing countries have not caused as much climate 
                                                 
18 The development elasticities can be thought of as reduced forms in which per capita income changes reflect many 
other factors, including policy responses and price changes as well as changes in demand. 13 
 
change, developed countries should be prepared to give them more aid to deal with the 
consequences.”  
 
Only a fundamental problem in the narrative on climate change can elicit such responses.  
The rich world has focused on greenhouse gas emissions. This has been unavoidable to some 
extent because the science, quite rightly, focuses on the “thing” that threatens the planet. But 
people, especially those in the poorer parts, don’t consume emissions. They consume basic 
energy services. And the reality is that most of them do not have access to basic cooking, heating 
and transportation services. To them, being asked to cut emissions is like asking them to go from 
just emerging above bare subsistence to, literally, the dark and ice ages.  
 
Developing countries themselves have not been blameless, and again the focus on emissions has 
played a role. They have succumbed to the rhetoric of recrimination. You the rich have created 
the global “bad” of polluting the atmosphere and you should therefore pay reparations going 
forward they say. But the rich retort by asking developing countries to take responsibility for 
their large populations and to take account of all the global “goods” they have created such as 
technology.  
 
Rarely, in history, have we seen constructive solutions coming out of blame games such as this.  
In this paper we suggest a way out of the current impasse. Our contribution is threefold. 
 
First, we posit some simple principles, focusing on energy needs (for consumers) and efficiency 
rather than emissions “rights,” as the appropriate indicators on which to build a narrative on what 
is fair in a climate accord.   
 
Our second contribution is methodological. We show that these principles can be quantified. To 
do so, we disaggregate existing data on emissions and energy production in a new way, enabling 
us to distinguish energy needs from the efficiency of energy use in production and consumption. 
This disaggregation allows us to quantify historical relationships between energy needs and the 
efficiency of energy use in production and consumption on the one hand, and development on 
the other. Our key result is that carbon efficiency gains have responded to “development” in the 
form of per capita income increases far more rapidly than has “conservation” in the use of energy 
services.   
 
Our third contribution relates to the results of our projections exercise. We use our empirically 
grounded “development elasticities” as the basis for defining clearly specified alternative 
assumptions for how they could change – our scenarios.  Along with country-specific 
information on likely growth of income and population we are able to quantify the magnitudes of 
likely and possible changes in emissions over the next four decades under our different 
assumptions.  Our key finding is that improvements in technology at rates consistent with those 
we observed historically, even for the most carbon-efficient economies among major emitters, 
provide little hope of meeting the broadly agreed global target for emissions reductions of 50 
percent relative to 1990.  
 
That implies that any prospect of meeting the aggregate global emissions target, consistent with 
developing countries not sacrificing their energy needs, will require massive, revolutionary, 
improvements in the technology margins (production and consumption) – far greater than seen 14 
 
historically. Only with these improvements and their worldwide diffusions would the current 
80:20 emissions reductions distribution between rich and poor advocated by Lord Stern and the 
UNDP be equitable and hence politically acceptable.  Otherwise this burden-sharing rule would 
almost surely be inequitable by our definition, since in developing countries managing even a 20 
percent reduction in emissions would imply lower pure energy use for given income by their 
people than enjoyed by people in developed countries.   
 
Our results also bear on the positions taken by the two major developing country players—China 
and India—on two key issues. First, our results suggest that the position advanced by the Indian 
Prime Minister—namely to seek equality of emissions per capita in the long run — should be re-
framed to set equality of access to energy services per capita as the appropriate long-run goal.  
 
Second, our results underline the logic of the position of China in announcing domestic targets 
focused on carbon efficiency while rejecting international commitments to emissions mitigation.  
Lord Stern has argued that developing countries should conditionally commit to emissions 
targets, with the conditions relating to appropriate financial and technological transfers. We 
would argue that the conditional commitment might be not to emissions targets but to carbon 
efficiency targets – and only later, when technological gains are proven feasible and financial 
and technological transfers are operating so that low-carbon innovations are actually increasingly 
available, to commit to international targets.   
 
Given the critical importance of achieving substantial technology gains, the world needs to go on 
war footing to meet this goal. Developing countries should themselves take the lead in initiating 
major international efforts on technology generation and dissemination. For example, they 
should negotiate massive support for public funding of green energy research, including by and 
in the rich countries, and for full access to new technologies, and they should consider making 
financial contributions commensurate with their size and financial ability to international funds 
for technology creation. In other words, developing countries’ rightful calls for equity must be 
combined with leadership—financial, technological, and institutional—in the collective effort to 
save the planet.   
 
At the international level, moreover,  much more attention needs to be devoted to the 
international rules and arrangements for generating and diffusing clean technology, and thus to 
the appropriate property rights regime to minimize the tradeoff between incentives for innovation 
and the logic of maximum low-cost and rapid access.  On this issue, both the United States, 
which has taken a traditional stance in defense of intellectual property rights to maximize private 
investment and innovation, and China, which is focused on maximizing access, would ideally 
collaborate in design of an effective arrangement.     
 
The United States and other developed countries should on their part abandon their call for 
immediate commitments from developing countries to reduce emissions, and focus instead on 
the nature of the bargain (between the public and private sectors as much or more than across 
countries) for maximizing technology creation and diffusion. They should welcome advanced 
developing countries’ programs focused on reducing the carbon-intensity of their production as 
rapidly as possible and focus on international verification of those gains as a basis for enhancing 
cooperation on financial, and especially, technology transfers for mitigation.   
 15 
 
Finally, our most fundamental point bears emphasis: if all countries could converge around a 
new shared narrative that places equality of energy opportunities at the forefront, this would  
naturally shift the focus of international cooperation from emissions and blame to maximizing 
efforts to achieving technology gains and rapidly transferring them worldwide.   
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Appendix 1: Data Description and Parameter Estimation 
 
The International Energy Agency provides detailed data on flows of energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions and energy supply, conversion, and consumption, broken down by fuel type 
and sector. This information is sufficient to break total final consumption into “consumption” 
and “production” activities as reported in the Data section. The categories used in the IEA data 
are similar to those presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Estimated emissions are provided for direct fuel combustion in each end-use sector. To this we 
add emissions resulting from electricity use in each sector. This is calculated by estimating the 
amount of carbon emitted by the domestic power sector for each unit of electricity and heat 
delivered to end users and multiplying by reported electricity and heat use. 
 
The IEA data includes a single end-use sector for road transportation emissions, which we must 
further decompose into consumption and production components. We take the consumption 
component as total emissions resulting from use of passenger cars. Data from the International 
Road Federation provide estimated miles traveled by passenger cars, trucks, and motorcycles by 
country-year. In the single case of the United States, we use vehicle census data from the Bureau 
of Transportation to add in miles traveled by sport utility vehicles and pickup trucks that are 
employed in personal use. 
 
To estimate emissions precisely, one would need the ratios of average fuel economy between 
passenger cars, trucks, and motorcycles for each country-year. Since this data does not exist, we 
simply assume these ratios based on data from the US Bureau of Transportation. For non-US 
countries, we assume that average emissions per mile traveled for the “truck” fleet (which 
includes large trailers) is 76% greater than that of passenger cars. Motorcycles emissions per 
mile traveled are assumed to be about 40% that of passenger cars. For the US, these figures are 
61% and 44%, respectively, reflecting the different composition of the “truck” and passenger 
car” categories in the US (the latter including SUV’s and pickup trucks). 
 
These ratios are applied to estimated miles traveled and the resulting values applied to total road 
emissions from the IEA data to estimate total emissions for each category (trucks, passenger 
cars, and motorcycles). Passenger cars and motorcycles are added together and constitute 
consumption-related transportation emissions. Truck emissions are added to non-road emissions 
(railroads, boats, etc.) and constitute production-related emissions. 
 
For country-years where there is insufficient data to make a direct calculation, an estimate is 
developed using a linear regression where the consumption-related share of total transportation 
emissions is the dependent variables and log of per capita GDP, the share of agriculture in GDP, 
the urban share of population and the urban share of population squared are the dependent 
variables, including region fixed-effects. The regression results (below) are used to fit a 
predicted value. This value is then used to linearly interpolate missing values in each country’s 
time series. The resulting value (estimated consumption-related share) is multiplied by total 
transportation emissions in the IEA data. 
 
Consumption-related emissions include those resulting from energy use in the residential sector 
and “passenger cars.” Production-related emissions are technically total energy-related emissions 17 
 
minus consumption-related emissions. In effect, this residual includes emissions resulting from 
commercial and public services, industry, agriculture (not including emissions from 
deforestation), and the “truck” and non-road components of transportation. 
 
Production and consumption emissions in 2005 are compiled for each country listed in Appendix 
Table 4.  Then, for the select countries listed in Appendix Table 5, emissions and supplied 
household energy are compiled for each year in the period 1994-2005.  From this data, we 
estimate the elasticities discussed in the text, and then apply the parameters to the emission-
levels for all countries in 2005 -- projecting forward to 2050.     
 
In Scenario I, we estimate business as usual, whereby we aggregate all country-years for the two 
groups -- developed and developing -- and estimate the parameters from pooled regressions, with 
fixed effects.  The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 3-5 in the text.  In Scenario 
II, we consider the development elasticities of individual countries.  The parameter estimates for 
individual countries are provided in Appendix Table 3. 
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 Appendix 2: Projecting Emissions in 2050 in the Business-As-Usual Scenario 
 
  In order to project global emissions in 2050, we divide total emissions (TE) into two, 
disjoint categories, namely production emissions (PE) and consumption emissions (CE), and we 
further disaggregate them as shown in equations 1-3 in the text. This disaggregation yields three 
variables of interest: energy use per capita; carbon intensity in production; and carbon intensity 
in consumption. We project total emissions by projecting each category separately, based on how 
consumption and production emissions have historically moved with population and GDP in 
both low and high income countries.  That is, we collect various elasticities of carbon emissions 
and intensities with respect to GDP for use in projecting emissions forward.  
  For production emissions, we estimate the elasticity of production carbon intensity 
(tCO2/$1000GDP) with respect to GDP per capita in PPP.  The parameter of interest is given by 
   in the following regression:  
 
log               log           ,   (1) 
 
where    is the ratio of production emissions to GDP (in constant dollars) for country i in year t, 
and     is GDP per capita in PPP. The estimating equation includes country fixed effects which 
we do not show for presentational simplicity. The parameter is estimated for all high income 
countries for the period 1995 to 2005, and separately for all low income countries for the period 
1995 to 2005.
19 
  For consumption emissions, the specification is slightly more complicated, since we are 
interested in more than one intensity measure on the consumption side.  First, we collect the 
elasticity of consumption energy use (ktoe/person) with respect to GDP per capita, or   in the 
following equation: 
 
log                log           ,   (2) 
 
where    is consumption energy per person for country i in year t, and     is GDP per capita in 
PPP.  (Again country fixed effects are not shown). The measure of consumption energy is 
effectively proxied by the amount of supplied residential energy (in ktoe), summed with the 
amount of energy supplied to personal automobiles (in ktoe).  Total consumption energy for each 
country-year will be denoted by     for future referenced.  The split between consumption and 
production emissions from road travel is approximated by combining IEA and IRF data.   
 
Second, we collect the elasticity of consumption emission intensity (tCO2/ktoe) to GDP per 
capita, represented by   : 
 
log                log           ,   (3) 
 
where    is the ratio of consumption emissions to consumption energy.   
 
                                                 
19 High and low income countries are determined by the World Bank classification.  Roughly, we define developing 
countries as low- and middle-income countries, according to the 2008 WDI.  Developed countries are high-income 
countries, both OECD and non-OECD.  We reclassify some countries, like Russia.  An exact list of “developed” and 
“developing” countries is provided in the Appendix Table 5. 19 
 
Thus, on the consumption side, profligacy is approximated by   and efficiency (or rather 
inefficiency) is approximated by   . Note that the alphas and gammas capture technology 
parameters while the beta is a behavioral parameter. 
  The estimated parameters describe the historical behavior of how carbon emissions and 
energy use have changed with GDP and population.  We use these parameters as the basis for our 
projections, with slight modifications or transformations to account for changing conditions and 
data quality.  Suppose, for now, that we insert directly the average elasticities estimated in 
equations (1), (2), and (3) as the provisional parameters into the “projection equations” below.   
 
       e x p      log        l o g           l o g           l o g       ]                          (4) 
   
      e x p       log        l o g           l o g           l o g                                (5)   
 
       e x p      log        l o g           l o g           l o g                              (6) 
 
where the subscript indicates the year (2005 or 2050) and country,      is the projected GDP in 
constant dollars in 2050 for country i, and      is the projected population in 2050 for country i.  
The GDP and population projections are extracted from the ERS International Macroeconomic 
Data Set, via the USDA.  The projection equations, then, relate future emissions and energy use 
to our parameter estimates    ,   ,     and secondary projections.  Note that equations (5) and 
(6) can be further compacted, so that: 
 
      e x p               log        l o g           l o g       /         l o g       ]        (7)   
 
The estimated elasticities from equations (1), (2), and (3) may not be the most appropriate to use 
in the projection equations.  That is, the historical (linear) path of emissions and energy use may 
not reflect what we expect to happen in the future.  We adjust the parameters accordingly.  
Essentially, we need a parameter that will reflect the experience for the period 2005-2050; 
roughly speaking we need the average elasticity between 2005 and 2050. For 2005, we use the 
estimated development elasticities. To obtain an estimated elasticity, we employ a quadratic 
model, so that the elasticity of, say, production intensity with respect to GDP per capita is 
allowed to vary with income.  The respecified production intensity regression is: 
 
log                 log            log                   ( 8 )    
 
This quadratic yields an elasticity that is itself a function of income. We can substitutue for the 
value of income that we have projected for 2050 and obtain the relevant elasticity for 2050. 
Projection equation (4) is adjusted accordingly: 
 
       e x p      ́       ́    /2  log        l o g           l o g           l o g       ]   (9)   
 
Where  ́   and  ́   refer to the elasticities for the two periods, the average of which is then used 
in the projection. A similar adjustment can be made for the consumption emissions projection.  
This is the framework we use to adjust the parameters; although, the actual parameter 
specification is slightly more complicated and idiosyncratic.  The precise specifications are 
articulated below. 20 
 
 
ALPHAS.  For the rich countries for 2005, the precise elasticity is calculated from the estimated 
quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the Rich 
country sample. For the rich countries for 2050, the precise elasticity is calculated from the 
estimated quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using projected average GDP per capita 
in 2050 for the rich country sample. 
 
For the poor 2005 countries for 2005, the elasticity is calculated from the estimated quadratic 
parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the poor country 
sample. For the poor countries for 2050, we use the idea that there will be convergence in the 
alphas (because this is broadly a technology parameter) matching the convergence in the 
incomes between rich and poor that we project. Specifically, for getting the 2050 elasticity for 
the poor countries, we calculate the ratio of rich to poor incomes in 2050 and 2005.  We then 
take the ratio of the ratios: rich to poor income ratio in 2050 over rich to poor income ratio in 
2005.  This final ratio represents the income convergence over the 2005-2050 period, and is used 
to appropriately scale the difference between the rich and poor alphas in 2005.  The idea is that 
the difference between the alphas will converge over 2005-2050 in line with the convergence of 
incomes.   
 
BETAS.  For the rich countries for 2005, the precise elasticity is calculated from the estimated 
quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the Rich 
country sample. For the rich countries for 2050, the precise elasticity is calculated from the 
estimated quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using projected average GDP per capita 
in 2050 for the rich country sample. This follows the same procedure that we used for the alphas. 
 
For the poor countries for 2005, the elasticity is calculated from the estimated quadratic 
parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the poor country 
sample just as we did for the alphas. For the poor countries for 2050, the elasticity is calculated  
from the estimated quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005, but sample for the rich 
countries), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the poor country sample. The reason we use 
the estimated elasticity from the rich country sample is based on the hypothesis that when the 
currently poor attain the incomes of today’s rich, their energy needs will be similar. Note that 
this would not be valid where we are estimating technology parameters but may be more 
defensible where we estimated behavioral parameters.  
 
GAMMAS.  For the rich countries for 2005, the precise elasticity is calculated from the 
estimated quadratic parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for 
the Rich country sample. For the rich countries for 2050, the precise elasticity is calculated by 
multiplying the 2005 Rich gamma by the ratio of 2050 Rich alpha over 2005 Rich alpha. The 
rationale is that gamma, which is really a technology parameter, will mimic the evolution of 
alpha, which is also a technology parameter. 
 
For the poor countries for 2005, the elasticity is calculated  from the estimated quadratic 
parameters (sample, 1994 – 2005), using average GDP per capita in 2005 for the poor country 
sample. For the poor countries for 2050, the gamma parameter is calculated in exactly the same 
way as the alpha parameter for the poor countries in 2050.  That is, it is the scaled difference 




























Bangladesh  36  0.24  0.36  0.09  7.48  0.38 
Denmark  48  8.77  0.33  1.38  6.07  0.19 
Philippines  76  0.90  0.33  0.17  7.21  0.54 
Pakistan  118  0.76  0.32  0.24  6.12  0.85 
Malaysia  138  5.38  0.27  0.59  7.07  0.90 
Netherlands  183  11.21  0.31  1.32  6.61  0.31 
Turkey  219  3.04  0.30  0.40  6.40  0.62 
Brazil  329  1.76  0.30  0.31  0.77  0.31 
South Africa  330  7.04  0.21  0.64  10.96  1.62 
Indonesia  341  1.55  0.30  0.35  10.67  1.15 
Australia  377  18.47  0.32  1.82  12.07  0.55 
France  388  6.38  0.42  1.61  0.94  0.16 
Mexico  389  3.78  0.37  0.54  7.86  0.39 
Italy  454  7.75  0.35  1.07  5.68  0.26 
United Kingdom  530  8.80  0.43  1.45  6.20  0.19 
Germany  813  9.86  0.40  1.52  6.54  0.25 
India  1,147  1.05  0.22  0.18  17.13  1.38 
Japan  1,214  9.50  0.28  1.11  5.18  0.18 
China  5,101  3.91  0.14  0.33  11.76  2.30 











Energy per capita)  OECD  Low Income  OECD  Low Income 
log(GDP per capita)  0.773***  0.963***  4.701*** ‐ 1.126 
   (16.17)  (12.42)  (2.835)  (‐1.204) 
log(GDP per capita)‐squared         ‐ 0.192**  0.126** 
         (‐2.369)  (2.241) 
Observations  292  144  292  144 






Intensity)  OECD  Low Income  OECD  Low Income 
log(GDP per capita) ‐ 0.911*** ‐ 0.548***  10.41***  0.209 
   (‐16.48)  (‐9.700)  (5.292)  (0.304) 
log(GDP per capita)‐squared         ‐ 0.551*** ‐ 0.0456 
         (‐5.757)  (‐1.103) 
Observations  282  156  282  156 






Intensity)  OECD  Low Income  OECD  Low Income  OECD 
Low 
Income 
log(GDP per capita) ‐ 0.128***  0.112** ‐ 6.049***  2.520*** ‐ 0.00116  0.270*** 
   (‐3.781)  (2.459)  (‐4.916)  (4.839)  (‐0.0244)  (4.843) 
log(GDP per capita)‐squared         0.288*** ‐ 0.145***        
         (4.813)  (‐4.639)        
Log[Production CO2 per Dollar GDP 
(constant$)]             0.140***  0.281*** 
            (3.736)  (4.413) 
Observations  282  144  282  144  282  144 











2005 ‐ 1.055 ‐ 0.053  0.712  33,043.74  30,979.23 
2050 ‐ 1.851 ‐ 0.092  0.435  68,056.99  62,223.61 
Poor 
2005 ‐ 0.586 ‐ 0.079  1.129  6,205.74  7,662.07 























Rich ‐ 1.453 ‐ 0.073  0.573 ‐ 48 ‐ 112  251 




Rich ‐ 2.081 ‐ 0.509 ‐ 0.314  12 ‐ 15  132 
Poor ‐ 1.735 ‐ 0.502  0.929 ‐ 47        
3. Avoiding 
Armageddon 
Rich ‐ 4.058 ‐ 0.993 ‐ 0.314  53  50  53 







































Rich  ‐5.072  ‐1.241  ‐0.31 63 63  38
Poor  ‐4.726  ‐1.234  0.929 64     
3b 
Rich ‐ 4.058 ‐ 0.993 ‐ 0.392  54  56  42 

































Australia 71  49  120  55 163  8  21  257 377 
Brazil 21  79  100  9 149  16  45  229 329 
China 612  126  738  246 3,399  201  102  4,362 5,101 
France 78  84  162  39 124  9  44  226 388 
Germany 201  128 329  105 320  10  22  485 813 
India 223  33  256  63 653  160  58  891 1,147 
Indonesia 65  37 102  24 171  7  30  239 341 
Japan 217  125  342  229 547  15  99  873 1,214 
Mexico 50  93  143  18 182  12  31  246 389 
Russia 197  73  270  101 870  29  42  1,274 1,544 
South Africa  49  21  70  33 169  9  19  260 330 
United Kingdom  142  86  228  70 196  4  34  302 530 
United States  1,237  1,267  2,504  1,060 1,589 51  263  3,313 5,817 
Notes: 1) Units are million metric tons of carbon dioxide. 2) Production-related emissions are technically calculated as total emissions minus consumption-related 
emissions. The sum of Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural, and Production transportation emissions does not sum exactly to the total for production-related 
emissions due to existence of emissions resulting from energy transformation; sectoral totals are given to illustrate relative sizes only. 3) Agricultural emissions 













































































Turkey  7,786  219  3.09  0.40  0.62  31,094  531  5.43  1.45  0.16  131  1.34  1.45  0.01 
Saudi Arabia  21,220  320  13.19  1.59  0.88  64,463  798  14.58  3.15  0.20  135  2.46  1.46  0.02 
Brazil  8,474  329  1.86  0.31  0.31  33,842  768  3.29  1.12  0.08  192  0.82  1.12  0.00 
South Africa  8,478  330  7.58  0.64  1.62  33,857  471  11.71  2.33  0.41  100  2.48  2.33  0.03 
Indonesia  3,209  341  1.56  0.35  1.15  18,747  1,004  3.42  1.83  0.20  203  0.69  1.83  0.01 
Spain  27,180  342  8.46  1.17  0.30  53,116  331  8.86  1.77  0.12  109  2.91  1.12  0.03 
Australia  34,106  377  19.11  1.82  0.55  66,651  489  19.13  2.75  0.22  155  6.08  1.73  0.06 
France  30,591  388  6.50  1.61  0.16  59,782  444  6.91  2.43  0.06  147  2.29  1.53  0.02 
Mexico  11,387  389  3.80  0.54  0.39  40,772  963  6.87  1.80  0.11  278  1.98  1.80  0.01 
Italy  27,750  454  8.09  1.07  0.26  54,229  370  8.24  1.62  0.11  119  2.65  1.02  0.03 
United Kingdom  31,371  530  8.92  1.45  0.19  61,306  632  9.55  2.20  0.08  211  3.19  1.39  0.02 
Canada  34,972  549  17.41  2.26  0.47  68,342  673  17.22  3.41  0.19  212  5.42  2.15  0.05 
Germany  30,445  813  9.92  1.52  0.25  59,495  828  10.47  2.30  0.10  273  3.45  1.45  0.03 
India  2,222  1,147  1.08  0.18  1.38  19,962  4,008  2.62  1.39  0.16  584  0.38  1.39  0.00 
Japan  30,290  1,214  9.70  1.11  0.18  52,976  1,038  9.46  1.57  0.08  388  3.54  1.07  0.03 
Russia  11,858  1,544  10.99  1.48  3.64  42,459  1,555  15.33  4.90  1.04  321  3.16  4.90  0.08 
China  4,088  5,101  3.96  0.33  2.30  23,881  8,796  6.30  1.73  0.41  1,266  0.91  1.73  0.01 









   AUS  CAN  DEU  FIN  FRA  GBR  USA  BRA  CHN  IDN  IND  MEX 
Beta Regression Results                                     
Log[GDP per capita, PPP]  0.314***  0.328***  0.128  0.355***  0.767***  0.133  0.804***  1.886***  1.011***  2.132***  0.288***  1.873*** 
   (0.0622)  (0.0258)  (0.0890)  (0.0358)  (0.0873)  (0.102)  (0.0377)  (0.273)  (0.0235)  (0.317)  (0.0822)  (0.136) 
Constant ‐ 10.17*** ‐ 10.04*** ‐ 8.559*** ‐ 10.65*** ‐ 15.19*** ‐ 8.683*** ‐ 14.83*** ‐ 25.49*** ‐ 18.31*** ‐ 26.75*** ‐ 13.17*** ‐ 25.50*** 
   (0.639)  (0.266)  (0.912)  (0.362)  (0.891)  (1.037)  (0.395)  (2.444)  (0.181)  (2.502)  (0.604)  (1.257) 
Observations  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
R‐squared  0.646  0.920  0.128  0.876  0.847  0.108  0.970  0.773  0.992  0.764  0.468  0.931 
Alpha Regression Results                                     
Log[GDP per capita, PPP] ‐ 0.404*** ‐ 0.445*** ‐ 2.081*** ‐ 0.614*** ‐ 1.244*** ‐ 1.275*** ‐ 1.137***  1.126*** ‐ 0.575***  0.382 ‐ 0.455*** ‐ 1.252*** 
   (0.0548)  (0.0467)  (0.150)  (0.184)  (0.110)  (0.0793)  (0.0556)  (0.260)  (0.0589)  (0.234)  (‐0.0407)  (0.0903) 
Constant ‐ 17.10*** ‐ 16.80*** ‐ 0.646 ‐ 15.56*** ‐ 9.717*** ‐ 9.224*** ‐ 9.796*** ‐ 32.01*** ‐ 15.29*** ‐ 23.73*** ‐ 16.86*** ‐ 9.994*** 
   (0.562)  (0.481)  (1.533)  (1.861)  (1.119)  (0.807)  (0.584)  (2.330)  (0.453)  (1.848)  (‐0.299)  (0.833) 
Observations  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
R‐squared  0.795  0.867  0.932  0.443  0.902  0.949  0.968  0.572  0.872  0.161  0.899  0.932 
Gamma Regression 
Results                                     
Log[GDP per capita, PPP]  0.265***  0.203*** ‐ 0.509***  0.0562 ‐ 0.0546 ‐ 0.330*** ‐ 0.140***  0.671***  0.0626***  0.332**  0.968***  0.0121 
   (0.0410)  (0.0502)  (0.0518)  (0.119)  (0.0669)  (0.0990)  (0.0251)  (0.135)  (0.0174)  (0.126)  (0.0921)  (0.0420) 
Constant ‐ 8.049*** ‐ 7.939*** ‐ 0.347 ‐ 6.240*** ‐ 5.488*** ‐ 2.197** ‐ 4.068*** ‐ 12.16*** ‐ 5.574*** ‐ 8.094*** ‐ 12.01*** ‐ 5.775*** 
   (0.421)  (0.517)  (0.531)  (1.204)  (0.683)  (1.007)  (0.264)  (1.208)  (0.134)  (0.992)  (0.677)  (0.388) 
Observations  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
R‐squared  0.749  0.537  0.873  0.016  0.046  0.442  0.689  0.639  0.481  0.333  0.888  0.006 





Netherlands Antilles  Iceland  Angola  Dominican Republic  Kenya  Pakistan  Tanzania 
United Arab Emirates  Israel  Albania  Algeria  Kyrgyz Republic  Panama  Ukraine 
Australia  Italy  Argentina  Ecuador  Cambodia  Peru  Uruguay 
Austria  Japan  Armenia  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Lebanon  Philippines  Uzbekistan 
Belgium  Korea, Rep.  Azerbaijan  Eritrea  Libya  Poland  Venezuela 
Bahrain  Kuwait  Benin  Ethiopia  Sri Lanka  Korea, Dem. Rep.  Vietnam 
Brunei Darussalam  Luxembourg  Bangladesh  Gabon  Lithuania  Paraguay  Yemen, Rep. 
Canada  Malta  Bulgaria  Georgia  Latvia  Romania  South Africa 
Switzerland  Netherlands  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Ghana  Morocco  Russia  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cyprus  Norway  Belarus  Guatemala  Moldova  Sudan  Zambia 
Czech Republic  New Zealand  Bolivia  Honduras  Mexico  Senegal  Zimbabwe 
Germany  Portugal  Brazil  Croatia  Macedonia, FYR  El Salvador   
Denmark  Qatar  Botswana  Haiti  Myanmar  Serbia and Montenegro   
Spain  Saudi Arabia  Chile  Hungary  Mongolia  Slovak Republic   
Estonia  Singapore  China  Indonesia  Mozambique  Syrian Arab Republic   
Finland  Slovenia  Cote d'Ivoire  India  Malaysia  Togo   
France  Sweden  Cameroon  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Namibia  Thailand   
United Kingdom  Trinidad and Tobago  Congo, Rep.  Iraq  Nigeria  Tajikistan   
Greece  United States  Colombia  Jamaica  Nicaragua  Turkmenistan   
Hong Kong     Costa Rica  Jordan  Nepal  Tunisia   
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Appendix Figure 1: Energy Use and Carbon Intensity of Consumption Disaggregated by 









Appendix Figure 2: Energy Use and Carbon Intensity of Consumption Disaggregated by 
Sectors (Selected Developed Countries), 1960-2005 
 
 
 
 
 